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A Cascade Model-Aware Generative Adversarial
Example Detection Method
Keji Han, Yun Li , and Bin Xia
Abstract: Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are demonstrated to be vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are
elaborately crafted to fool learning models. Since the accuracy and robustness of DNNs are at odds for the
adversarial training method, the adversarial example detection algorithms check whether the specific example is
adversarial, which is promising to solve the issue of the adversarial example. However, among the existing methods,
model-aware detection methods do not generalize well, while the detection accuracies of the generative-based
methods are lower compared to the model-aware methods. In this paper, we propose a cascade model-aware
generative adversarial example detection method, namely CMAG. CMAG consists of two first-order reconstructors
and a second-order reconstructor, which can illustrate what the model sees to the human by reconstructing the logit
and feature maps of the last convolution layer. Experimental results demonstrate that our method is effective and is
more interpretable compared to some state-of-the-art methods.
Key words: information security; Deep Neural Network (DNN); adversarial example detection

1

Introduction

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)[1–3] become increasingly
security-sensitive, even they have achieved excellent
performance in many machine learning tasks, such as
Computer Vision (CV)[3, 4] , Neural Language Processing
(NLP)[5, 6] , and Speech Recognition (SR)[7] . DNNs
are demonstrated to be vulnerable to adversarial
examples[8–11] . Adversarial examples are crafted by the
adversary to ruin the performance of the target model
with specific attack algorithms[12, 13] . In detail, the
adversarial example is generated by adding adversarial
perturbation into the legitimate example. According
to the knowledge of the adversary, attack algorithms
fall into two categories: white-box attack and blackbox attack[9] . In the white-box attack scenario, the
adversary has perfect knowledge of the target model,
including architecture, parameters, and training set. As
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to the black-box attack, the adversary only has limited
knowledge compared to the white-box scenario.
According to our knowledge, the existing attack
methods fall into three categories, namely gradientbased, optimization-based, and gradient-free methods,
according to the process to explore adversarial
perturbation. Gradient-based attacks employ gradient
information to craft adversarial examples: Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM)[14] crafts adversarial example with
the sign of the gradient with respect to the ground-truth
label; least-likely attack[15] adds the sign of the gradient
with respect to the smallest probability label. Gradientbased attack methods can be formulated as
xadv D x C   G.rx `.f .xI θ /; y/
O
(1)
where xadv is a crafted adversarial example, x is an
example, and yO is a label. f ./ is the target (victim)
model with parameter set  . rx `.f .xI  /; y/
O is the
gradient of x. G./ is the gradient map function, such as
sign function and unit function.  is a hyperparameter
to control the attack intensity.
Optimization-based methods formulate the process to
explore adversarial perturbation into an optimization as
follows:
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minf .x/ 6D f .x C ı /;
ı

s.t.

kıı kp 6 

(2)

where ı and  denote adversarial perturbation and the
upper bound of lp norm of the adversarial perturbation,
respectively. For instance, Calini & Wagner (CW)
attack[16] explores the smallest adversarial perturbation
with lp norm constraint. Deepfool[17] minimizes the
distance between the adversarial example and the target
hyperplane.
Gradient-free attacks craft the adversarial examples
by exploring the corresponding adversarial perturbation
with specific searching strategy or module. One
pixel attack[18] explores adversarial perturbation with
Differential Evolution (DE) algorithm, which employs
no gradient information of the corresponding legitimate
examples. Adversarial Transformation Network
(ATN)[19] directly maps the legitimate example as an
adversarial example, the difference between the original
example and mapping result can be viewed as the
adversarial perturbation, by employing a transformation
network. The attack methods are summarized in Table 1.
To mitigate the impact of adversarial example, couples
of defense algorithms have been proposed. According
to the aim of defender, current defense algorithms
are divided into two categories: model-strengthening
and adversarial example detection. Model-strengthening
defense algorithms try to protect the gradient of the target
model, while detection algorithms are introduced to
make the target model keep off the adversarial example,
without changing the model itself.
Model-strengthening methods try to make the target
model itself robust against adversarial examples with
retaining itself or some supplementary modules. The
effectiveness of model-strengthening methods generally
roots in gradient-confused[20] . Adversarial training
methods[21–24] aim to make the target model loss of
examples to be zeros, vanishing the gradient. Feature
nullification methods[25] try to mask the original
gradients. Wang et al.[26] added a non-differential
module into the target model, while retaining the
accuracy.
Detection methods for adversarial examples of DNNs
fall into two categories: metric-based and additionalTable 1 Current attack methods.
Attack type
Method
Gradient-based
FGSM[14] , least-likely attack[15]
Optimization-based
CW[16] , Deepfool[17]
Gradient-free
DE[18] , ATN[19]
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model-based. Metric-based detection methods[27, 28]
check whether the given example is an adversarial
example by specific metric, such as mean variance
and kernel density. Additional-model-based methods
can be divided into two classes: discriminative-modelbased and generative-model-based. Discriminativemodel-based[29] methods train a (or more) classifier(s)
to check whether the given example is adversarial,
while generative-model-based methods[30–32] try to
reconstruct the given example, then evaluate whether the
example is adversarial by calculating the Reconstruction
Error (RE) between the original and the corresponding
reconstruction result. Wang et al.[29] trained couples of
binary classifiers with outputs of different convolution
layers as inputs to detect adversarial examples. Feature
squeezing[32] reduces the color-bit depth of original
example. If the distance between logits of the
original example and the corresponding color-bit depthreduced example exceeds the predefined threshold, the
original example will be detected as an adversarial
example. MagNet[30] trains few autoencoders to detect
adversarial examples. In detail, if the reconstruction
error, l2 norm of the difference between the original
and the corresponding reconstruction result, exceeds the
predefined threshold, the original example is detected as
an adversarial example. Defense Generative Adversarial
Network (Defense GAN)[31] is an extension of MagNet,
which employs GAN to reconstruct the given inputs.
Defense GAN introduces optimization strategy to search
more efficient, which is a low-dimensional vector to fed
to the generator. The defense methods are summarized
in Table 2.
In model-strengthening methods, the legitimate
example and the corresponding adversarial example are
at odds to update the parameters of DNNs, so modelstrengthening method will degrade the performance of
the target model on legitimate examples. Detection
defense methods are promising to mitigate the odds
between the robustness and accuracy of the target
model by keeping the target model off the adversarial
example. However, few detection algorithms focus on
interpretability and are ineffective to some optimizationbased attack. In this paper, we propose a Cascade
Table 2
Defense type
Model-strengthening
method
Adversarial example
detection

Current defense methods.
Method
Adversarial training[21–24] , feature
nullification[25]
Metric-based[27, 28] , additional-modelbased[30–32]
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Model-Aware Generative adversarial examples detection
method (CMAG), which employs Structural SIMilarity
(SSIM) index[33] as additional training loss and detection
criterion. Different from current generative modelbased methods, CMAG consists of two first-order
reconstructors and a second-order reconstructor. By
cascading reconstruction, CMAG explains what the
target model sees to the human. The experimental
results demonstrate that it is more efficient to detect
optimization-based adversarial examples compared to
current generative model-based methods.
Our contributions are summarized as follows.
 We propose a vision-interpretable adversarial
examples detection method, CMAG;
 We theoretically prove the effectiveness of our
method;
 We provide a new perspective of the existence of
the adversarial example.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, some related definitions involved in this
paper are introduced. CMAG is introduced in Section
3. Experiments are introduced in Section 4. Discussions
are conducted in Section 5, while conclusions are drawn
in Section 6.

2

Preliminary

Before the introduction of the proposed CMAG, some
related definitions will be introduced in this section.
2.1

lp norm

lp norm is generally employed to generative model.
X is the training set. For a specific example, xk 2 X,
jxk j is the cardinality of x, jxk j D N . xik 2 xk ; i D
1; 2; : : : ; N , lp .xk / is formulated as
v
p
uN
uX
l .x / D t
jxi jp
(3)
p

k

k

i D1

l1 and l2 are common lp norm. The corresponding
derivatives of xk are formulated as follows:
@xT xk
@l2 .xk /
D k D 2xk ;
@xk
@xk
@l1 .xk /
D sign.xk /
(4)
@xk
2.2 Distillation
Distillation is proposed in Ref. [34]. DNN-based
classifier commonly has a softmax layer in the image
classification task. The softmax layer normalizes
the output of the layer prior the softmax, z.x/, into
a probability vector softmax.x/, i.e., the logit. Each

component softmax.x/i ; i 2 0; 1; : : : ; K 1, denotes
the probability that x belongs to the corresponding
category, where K is the number of the classes. The
distillation can be formulated as follows:
ez.x/i =T
softmax.x/i D
; i 2 0; 1; : : : ; K 1; T > 0
K
X1
ez.x/j =T
j D0

(5)
where T is introduced to adjust the proportion of
probabilities of the classes. For instance, when T !
1, softmax.x/i is approximate 1=K for all i 2 0; 1;
:::;K
1. Conversely, when T ! 0, the biggest
element of softmax.x/ is close to 1, while the rest
elements are approximate to 0.
2.3

SSIM

lp norm is always employed to evaluate the similarity
between the legitimate example and the corresponding
adversarial example. However, it may cause a difference
between recognition results of DNNs and human, since
lp norm is not a human-vision consistent metric. So
to get good interpretability, it is wise to introduce the
human-sensitive criterion as the loss function. Zhao et
al.[35] speculated that the human is sensitive to structural
patterns change in an image. Zhou et al.[33] introduced
SSIM to simulate the human-sensitive similarity between
two images.
For a given example xk , the mean intensity is
calculated as
N
1 X i
xk D
xk
(6)
N
i D1

where xik (i D 0; : : : ; N 1) is the i -th pixel of xk and N
is the number of the pixels. The standard deviation and
the square root of the variance are applied to estimate
the signal contrast. Furthermore, the unbiased standard
deviation can be formulated as
!1=2
N
X
1
i
xk D
.xk xk /
(7)
N 1
i D1

Moreover, for two examples, xi1 and xi2 , the covariance
x1 x2 can be estimated as
N
1 X i
x1 x2 D
.x1 x1 /.xi2 x2 /
(8)
N 1
i D1

Given two images x1 and x2 , the luminance L.x1 ; x2 /,
contrast C.x1 ; x2 /, and structural S.x1 ; x2 / are defined
as
2x x C c1
L.x1 ; x2 / D 2 1 22
;
x1 C x2 C c1
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2x1 x2 C c2
;
x21 C x22 C c2
2x1 x2 C c3
S.x1 ; x2 / D
(9)
x1 x2 C c3
where c1 , c2 , and c3 are constants, introduced for the
reason that 2x1 C 2x2 is commonly close to zero. From
the definitions above, it can be speculated that luminance
is the function of the mean, while the contrast depends
on variance.
The SSIM index between examples x1 and x2 is
C.x1 ; x2 / D

SSIM.x1 ; x2 / D ŒL.x1 ; x2 /˛  ŒC.x1 ; x2 /ˇ 
ŒS.x1 ; x2 /

(10)

where ˛ > 0, ˇ > 0, and
> 0 are super meters
employed to adjust the relative importance of the three
components. In this paper, we set ˛ D ˇ D D 1.
According the definition of L./, C./, and S./, it
can be known that L./; C./; and S./ 2 .0; 1, for
2x1 C 2x2 > 2x1 x2 , xi1 2 Œ0; 1; xi2 2 Œ0; 1; and
i D 0; : : : ; N 1.
2.4

Adversarial training

Since adversarial examples can ruin the performance
of target DNN[10, 13] , the defender can retrain the DNN
to with adversarial example to improve the robustness,
which is the basic idea of the adversarial training.
Furthermore, we can formulate the retraining process of
DNN as follows:
X
X
min ˛
`.f .xI  /; y/ C .1 ˛/
`.f .xI  /; y/


x2X

x2Xadv

(11)
where x is an example, while y is its corresponding
label. If x is an adversarial example, y is the label
of its corresponding legitimate example. X and Xadv
are the legitimate example set and adversarial example
set, respectively. ˛ is a hyperparameter to balance
the importance of legitimate examples and adversarial
ones. `./ is the loss function, commonly being the
cross-entropy for the classification task. As shown in
Eq. (11), adversarial training can be viewed as an
extension of regulation, which also demonstrates the
effectiveness of the adversarial training to improve the
robustness of the target model. However, Eq. (11) also
demonstrates that the adversarial example competes with
the legitimate example to update parameters of the target
model. That is the reason we focus on the adversarial
example detection methods.

3
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CMAG

Adversarial example detection is the primary task of
mitigating the odds between the accuracy and robustness
of the target model. As the definition in Ref. [12],
adversarial examples are examples that crafted by the
adversary to fool DNNs, while being imperceptible to the
human. To detect the adversarial example, it is wise to
known the feature representation of the input in the target
model. So we conduct experiments to reconstruct the
outputs of the last feature extraction module and the last
fully connected layer. Here, we denote the victim model
as f ./, and the target model of layers from the input
layer to the last feature extraction layer as ffm ./. DNNs
are generally trained with lp norm or cross-entropy loss,
which are insensitive and low-interpretability to humans.
So it is vital to explore the human-sensitive loss to
improve the interpretability of DNNs. For instance, in
computer vision task, luminance, contrast, structural,
etc., are demonstrated to be human-sensitive[35] , which
should be introduced to train DNNs. Since SSIM is
the function of the luminance, contrast, and structural
measures related, it can be employed as loss function to
train DNNs to improve the interpretability.
To understand why adversarial examples can attack
DNNs, it is necessary to visualize the feature
representation of adversarial examples in DNNs, which
is the motivation of our detection method. Since the
model-aware method uses the feature maps of the target
model, it can achieve higher detection accuracy than the
model-agnostic method. So we reconstruct the original
input of the target model with the feature maps and
the final probability vector of the target model. The
workflow of CMAG, which consists of the SSIM-based
detector, is presented in Fig. 1. Modules in the blue
dash box are the target model, taking the classification
model as an instance. The specific process is depicted as
follows:
(1) Feature-Map Reconstructor (FMR) reconstructs
the original input with the output of the feature extraction
module, and Logit Reconstructor (LR) reconstructs the
original input with the output of the softmax layer, i.e.,
the logit;
(2) Employ the output of the FMR as the attention of
the output of LR by calculating their Hardmard product
h.x/ as the input of the Global Reconstructor (GR);
(3) GR reconstructs the original input again with h.x/
as the input, marking its output as x0 . GR is the module
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Fig. 1 Workflow of CMAG in the deployment phase. CMAG includes two first-order reconstruct, named FMR and LR, and a
second-order reconstructor, named GR. If the Reconstruct Error (RE) of x with respect to GR exceeds the given threshold Thr,
it will be detected as an adversarial example.

to interpret what the target model sees from the original
input;
(4) The detector module evaluates the similarity (or
distance) between the reconstruction result and the
original input to check whether the original input is an
adversarial example.
The loss of FMR can be formulated as follows:
`fmr D fmr kFMR.ffm .x// xk22 C
.1

fmr /SSIM.FMR.ffm .x//; x/

The loss of LR is
`lr D lr kLR.softmax.f .x///
.1

xk22 C

lr /SSIM.LR.softmax.f .x///; x/

The loss of the GR is
`gr D gr kx0 xk22 C .1

(12)

gr /SSIM.x0 ; x/

(13)
(14)

where fmr , lr , and gr are hyperparameters to balance
the importance between lp loss and SSIM loss. FMR()
and LR() are the FMR and LR module functions,
respectively. Furthermore, the detail training processes
of GR are shown in Algorithm 1, where r `gr is the
partial derivate of `gr with respective to  .
3.1

FMR

FMR is utilized to map outputs of ffm ./ into the
original feature space. The training loss function of
FMR is shown in Eq. (12). The role of FMR is to
reconstruct the original input with high-level feature
representation, which contains semantic features. An
adversarial example is quasi-imperceptible to humans,

Algorithm 1 Training process of GR
Require: Legitimate examples sets X, pretrained FMR and
LR; GR’s parameter  I training epochs II and learning rate .
1: for i D 1 to I do
2:
for x in X do
3:
h.x/
FMR.ffm .x// ˝ LR.f .x//
4:
x0
GR.h.x//
5:
Calculate `gr between x0 and x according to Eq. (14))
6:
g
5 `gr
7:

   g
8:
end for
9: end for

while it can fool the target model. According to this
observation, we speculate that the low-level feature
maps of the original example and the corresponding
adversarial example should be similar, so it is hard
to detect adversarial examples with low-level feature
maps (or even the original example itself). Furthermore,
compared to the output of f ./, the output of ffm ./ is
lower-level features. Therefore, it is useful to consider
the final output of the target model as the augmented
feature.
3.2

LR

FMR tries to learn the semantic region of the
original example, while LR is designed to reconstruct
the semantic features of the original example with
the logit. The loss function of LR is shown in
Eq. (13). According to the definition of the adversarial
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example, the logits of the legitimate example and its
corresponding adversarial example are different. In
detail, the biggest elements for logits of the legitimate
and adversarial example are different. In some cases,
the difference is so subtle that it is difficult to correctly
reconstruct the original input with the logit. Fortunately,
the distillation can be adopted to mitigate this issue,
which can endow the logits of adversarial examples
and the corresponding legitimate with similar statistical
characteristics. According to Eq. (5), smaller T (T > 0)
increases the proportion of the max component, while
decreases proportions of other components. For instance,
the target model, with the softmax layer and T D 1,
does not confirm which category the adversarial example
belongs to, if the top-2 elements of the logit are 0.491
and 0.490. When T is reset as 1=1000, the values of
top-2 approximately become 1 and 0. However, the
probability vector’s dimension is so small that it is
difficult to reconstruct the original example with only the
logit. So we introduce GR, which takes the combination
of outputs of FMR and LR as input.
3.3

GR

GR is introduced to interpret what the target mode
realizes about the original input, taking the Hardmard
product of the outputs of FMR and LR as input.
Since FMR and LR focus on different level feature
representations, combining them as the input of GR helps
to improve the quality of reconstruction example. The
experimental results also demonstrate that GR achieves
more excellent reconstruction performance.
3.4

Adversarial example detector

Adversarial example detector checks whether the given
example is an adversarial example, according to the
outputs of the GR. We apply variant criteria, such as
SSIM and l2 , to our detctor to evaluate differences
between x (the original example) and x0 (the output of
GR). The detection threshold searching module is shown
in Algorithm 2. According to Eqs. (3) and (10), if the
reconstruction error exceeds any threshold determined
in Algorithm 2, the example will be detected as an
adversarial example.

4
4.1

Experiment
Experiment setting

Three datasets, MNIST[36] , Fashion-MNIST (FMNIST)[37] ,
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Algorithm 2 SSIM-based adversarial example detection
algorithm
Require: Training set X; f ./; ffm ./; ThrSSIM and Thrl2
(thresholds of reconstruction errors for the SSIM and l2 detectors,
respectively); output of GR x0
Initialize ThrSSIM
1, Thrl2
0
for x in X: do
Reconstruct the example with FMR and LR, denoted as
FMR.ffm .x// and LR.softmax.f .x///;
Calculate the Hadmard product between outputs of FMR and
LR, h.x/ D FMR.ffm .x// ˝ LR.f .x//;
Reconstruct the example with GR, taking h.x/ as input,
marked as x0 ;
Calculate SSIM.x; x0 / and l2 .x; x0 / according to Eqs. (10)
and (3), respectively.
if SSIM.x; x0 / < ThrSSIM then
ThrSSIM D SSIM.x; x0 /;
end if
if l2 .x; x0 / > Thrl2 then
Thrl2 D l2 .x; x0 /;
end if
end for
return ThrSSIM and Thrl2

and GTSRB[38] are employed to evaluate the
performance of defense methods involved in this
paper. MNIST consists of a training set, including
60 000 grayscale hand-written digits images with size
28 pixel  28 pixel of 10 classes, and a testing set with
10 000 examples. FMNIST is an extension of MNIST.
In detail, FMNIST also consists of 10 categories, named
T-shirt, Trouser, Pullover, Dress, Coat, Sandal, Shirt,
Sneaker, Bag, and Ankle boot. Moreover, the number of
examples and the size of the example are the same with
MNIST. As to GTSRB, since examples of it with variant
size, we scale them into uniform size 32 pixel  32 pixel.
The train set of GTSRB consists of 39 209 color image
examples of 43 categories, while the testing set consists
of 12 630 examples.
We set fmr D lr D gr D 0:5 in Eqs. (12)–(14),
which is consistent with the setting of Zhao et al.[35] .
FMR, LR, and GR are trained with Adam[39] optimizer,
learning rate is 10 3 . In training phase, the batch size is
set 2000, while in testing phase batch size is 200 for three
datasets. FGSM and CWl2 attack methods are adopted to
evaluate the robustness of detection algorithms involved
in this paper, and CWl2 is the CW attack with l2 norm.
Moreover, to improve the detection difficulty, attack
intensities of CWl2 are set to be small.
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4.2

Detection accuracy

In this section, we do experiments to compare the
detection accuracies of our method with some state-ofthe-art generative detection methods, under FGSM and
CWl2 attacks with different attack intensities.
The details of our method mentioned in Tables 3–5
are shown in Algorithm 2. As shown in Tables 3–5, our
method achieves best detection performance, compared
to MagNet and Defense GAN. According to the
Tables 3–5, we note that all generative detection methods
are efficient to detect FGSM adversarial example, while
MagNet and Defense GAN are poor at detecting CW
adversarial examples, since the attack intensity is small.
To demonstrate the difference between FGSM and CW
adversarial examples, we show two types of adversarial
examples in Fig. 2.
As shown in Fig. 2, different from FGSM adversarial
examples, CW adversarial examples of three datasets are
almost imperceptible to human, since the attack intensity
is set small. As mentioned in Section 3, the adversarial
Table 3 Comparison of detection accuracies of our method
with MagNet and Defense GAN, under different attack
intensities on MNIST, where  and confidence represent the
attack intensities of FGSM and CWl2 , respectively.
Detection
method
MagNet
Defense GAN
Our method

0.1
1.00
1.00
1.00


0.2
1.00
1.00
1.00

Attack intensity
Confidence
0.3
9
19
29
1.00
1.00 1.00 0.21
1.00
0.00 0.02 0.05
1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00

Table 4 Comparison of detection accuracies of our method
with MagNet and Defense GAN, under FGSM and CWl2 with
different attack intensities on FMNIST.
Attack intensity
Detection

Confidence
method
0.1
0.2
0.3
9
19
29
MagNet
1.00 1.00 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.23
Defense GAN 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
Our method
1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 5 Comparison of detection accuracies of our method
with MagNet and Defense GAN, under FGSM and CWl2 with
different attack intensities on GTSRB.
Attack intensity
Detection

Confidence
method
0.1
0.2
0.3
9
19
29
MagNet
1.00 1.00 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
Defense GAN 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
Our method
1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.00

(a) MNIST

(b) FMNIST

(c) GTSRB

Fig. 2 Legitimate and the corresponding CW and FGSM
adversarial examples of MNIST, FMNIST, and GTSRB. In
each subfigure, the first column is the legitimate example
and the second and third columns are the CW and FGSM
adversarial examples, respectively. Moreover, the attack
intensity of FGSM is 0.3, and the attack intensity of CW is 19.

example and its corresponding legitimate are almost
the same, while logits corresponding them are much
more different. The effectiveness of our method to detect
CW adversarial example roots in that it can measure
misalignment between variant-level features of the target
model. If an example is adversarial, high-level features
(semantic features) misalign with the corresponding lowlevel features (original pixel features). Our method maps
the high-level feature into the original feature space, then
compares it with the original example. Different from
the existing methods, our method is more efficient when
the `p norm of the adversarial perturbation is smaller.
To further illustrate the effectiveness of our method,
we show the average SSIM similarity between the
adversarial example and its corresponding reconstruction
result for FGSM and CWl2 in Table 6. Threshold
represents the average SSIM similarity between
legitimate example and its corresponding reconstruction
result. As shown in Table 6, since the threshold is
much bigger than the SSIM similarity between the
adversarial example and its corresponding reconstruction
result, we can speculate that our method makes
a clear distinction between the legitimate and
adversarial examples. Moreover, SSIM similarity
between the adversarial example and the corresponding
Table 6 Average SSIM similarities between reconstruction
results and corresponding adversarial examples of
MNIST, FMNIST, and GTSRB. Threshold represents
the smallest SSIM similarity between the legitimate inputs
and corresponding reconstruction results.
Attack intensity
Dataset

Confidence
Threshold
0.1
0.2
0.3
9
19
29
MNIST 0.442 0.442 0.442 0.654 0.532 0.442 0.824
FMNIST 0.145 0.101 0.074 0.400 0.375 0.331 0.763
GTSRB 0.362 0.185 0.109 0.748 0.712 0.674 0.757
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reconstruction result decreases with the attack intensity
increasing. We can conclude that higher attack
intensity of adversarial examples, the easier detection.
Furthermore, factors that impact the detection accuracy
will be discussed in the following section.
4.3

Theoretical analysis of the effectiveness of
CMAG

According to the Ref. [35], we know
1
MSE.x1 ; x2 /
D1C
(15)
SSIM.x1 ; x2 /
2x1 x2 C c2
Then we can get
p
1 SSIM.x1 ; x2 /
.2x1 x2 C c2 /
kx1 x2 k2 D N 
SSIM.x1 ; x2 /
(16)
So we speculate that the detectabilities of the adversarial
example under SSIM metric and lp -norm metric are
equivalent. To be simple, we just prove the detectability
of the adversarial example under l2 metric.
Theorem 1 Since modules of the CMAG are
only trained with legitimate examples, we assume
that k.f .x// xk2 6 e1 , k.f . //  k2 > e2 , and
e2 > 2e1 , ./ is the reconstruction model. Ω and x
represent the example space and an example of Ω , 8x 2
˝ , and  is its corresponding adversarial perturbation. e1
and e2 are constants. Then k.f .x C  // .x C  /k2 >
e1 .
Proof
k.f .x C // .x C /k2 
k.f .x/

x C .f .//

k2 >
k.f .x// xk2 >

k.f .// k2
e2 e1 > e1
(17)
According to Theorem 1, we know that 8x 2 Ω , if x
is a legitimate example, the reconstruction error is less
than or equal to e1 , while if x is an adversarial example,
the reconstruction error is bigger than e1 .
To test the validity of the hypothesis, we conduct the
experiment that compares the reconstruction errors of
the legitimate example and the corresponding adversarial
perturbation, and the experimental results are shown in
Table 7.
Table 7 l2 reconstruction error of legitimate and adversarial
examples on MNIST, FMNIST, and GTSRB.
Attack intensity
Dataset Legitimate

Confidence
0.1
0.2
0.3
9
19
29
MNIST 3.165 9.469 10.551 12.073 8.841 8.980 9.111
FMNIST 3.771 9.680 10.696 12.335 9.352 9.850 10.293
GTSRB 6.213 14.846 18.355 22.185 12.535 12.682 12.687
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Discussion

In this section, some additional experiments are
conducted to explain the details of the proposed method.
(1) Why outputs of ffm (  ) and f (  ) are chosen to
reconstruct the given example?
The adversarial example can fool the DNNs while
having little impact on human vision, which means
that there is a distinct difference between human and
computer vision. To improve the interpretability of the
detection algorithm, it is wise to explore the target
model from the given example. Low-level feature
maps represent local features, such as gray values
and edge features, while high-level features contain
more semantic information[40] . The outputs of ffm ./
and f ./ as high-level features contain more semantic
information that is different for the adversarial example
and its corresponding legitimate. So our method employs
outputs of ffm ./ and f ./ to reconstruct the given
example.
We may also concern the ground-truth reconstruct
results. MagNet and Defense GAN reconstruct the
original example themselves without any information
from the target model, which is different from our
method. Additional experiments are conducted to
show ground-truth reconstruction results of adversarial
examples for our method, MagNet, and Defense GAN,
and the experimental results are shown in Fig. 3. As
shown in Fig. 3, the ground-truth reconstruction results
of our method illustrate what the target model realizes
for the given adversarial example, while reconstruction
results of MagNet and Defense GAN are similar with
original examples. The more significant the difference

(a) MNIST FGSM

(b) MNIST CW

(c) FMNIST FGSM

(d) FMNIST CW

(e) GTSRB FGSM

(f) GTSRB CW

Fig. 3 Comparison of ground-truth reconstruction results
of our method, MagNet, and Defense GAN on adversarial
examples of MNIST, FMNIST, and GTSRB. In each subfigure,
from left to right, the original adversarial examples are in the
first column, its corresponding reconstruction examples of our
method, MagNet, and Defense GAN are in columns 2–4.
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between the original example and corresponding
reconstruction result, the more likely the example is
marked as an adversarial example. Since the adversarial
example is crafted to fool the target model, the feedback
of the target model is helpful to detect adversarial
examples, which is the difference between our method
and other generative model-based methods. As shown in
Fig. 3b, our method can even output an example belong
to the adversarial category.
(2) What impacts the detection accuracy of the
generative method?
The effectiveness of the generative method roots
in the difference between reconstruction errors of the
legitimate example and adversarial example. In detail,
the adversarial example achieves higher reconstruction
error compared to the legitimate example. We will
introduce two factors which moderately impact the
reconstruction error in the following paragraphs.
Fitting the ground-truth distribution of legitimate
examples is a vital factor that impacts the detection
accuracy of the given generative method. To better fit
the ground-truth distribution, the employed generative
model should be endowed suitable complexity to get
enough representation ability, while being intractable
to train. Furthermore, the employed generative model’s
performance is determined by some involving factors,
such as training data, training epochs, and loss function.
Metric of the reconstruction error is another factor that
impacts detection accuracy. We should select a sensitive
metric to measure the difference between the original
input and the corresponding reconstruction result.
Statistic characteristics and lp norm are commonly
employed to evaluate the difference. However, metric
mentioned above is lack of interpretability for human.
In Ref. [35], it is demonstrated that the human is not
sensitive to l2 perturbation, while DNNs do. So it is
vital to design more interpretable and sensitive metric
for adversarial examples detection.
(3) Why attention is adopted to combine outputs
of ffm (  ) and f (  )?
Attention[6] is commonly applied to NLP task to
make the model get long-time memory. In our detection
method, we speculate the output of the FMR can be
employed to help LR to reconstruct the given example,
since outputs of LR and FMR are highly relative.
Moreover, feature maps derive logit, which is similar
to the relationship between the corpus and the semantic.
Furthermore, we conduct experiments to reconstruct
the given example with different combinations of

outputs of LR and FMR, and the results are shown
in Fig. 4. As shown in Fig. 4, the combination of
outputs of LR and FMR endows GR with better
reconstruction performance, compared to the Weighted
Average (WA). We speculate that attention keeps the
integrity of the information outputs of LR and FMR.
Furthermore, to explore the functions of modules in our
method, ablation experiments are conducted. In detail,
we conduct experiments to compare the reconstruction
results of LR, FMR, and GR on MNIST and GTSRB,
and the results are shown in Figs. 5 and 6, respectively.
As shown in Figs. 5 and 6, descending order of
reconstruction results with respect to three generative
modules (LR, FMR, and GR) is GR>FMR>LR. The
order coincides with the scale of the information of
inputs of three generative models, demonstrating that
better reconstruction performance requires sufficient
information as input.
(4) A new perspective on existence of the
adversarial example
We speculate that it is the difference between human
and computer visions that causes the existence of
adversarial examples. In other words, it is hard to
avoid the existence of the adversarial example. Shafahi
et al.[41] speculated that the adversarial example is
inevitable. Furthermore, Tsipras et al.[42] concluded that
robustness may be at odds with accuracy, and the target
model rarely achieves 100% accuracy on adversarial
example. However, we can take measures to mitigate the

(a) MNIST attention

(b) FMNIST attention

(c) GTSRB attention

(d) MNIST WA

(e) FMNIST WA

(f) GTSRB WA

Fig. 4 Comparison of reconstruction results of GR with
different combinations of outputs of FMR and LR on MNIST,
FMNIST, and GTSRB. In detail, attention represents to
calculate the dot product of outputs of FMR and LR, while
the WA represents sum outputs of FMR and LR with specific
normalized weight. Here we set the two weights to 0.5.
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(a) Adversarial

(b) GR

is trained with SSIM loss and l2 norm loss. The results
are shown in Figs. 7 and 8. According to Figs. 7 and
8, we note that the gradient of l2 loss trained model is
moderately correlated with semantic regions, while the
gradient of the model trained with SSIM loss aligns well
with the semantic regions (two models are trained with
the same process except the loss function). That is to say,
FGSM attack is unable to ruin an autoencoder trained
with SSIM loss. Furthermore, we can conclude that
generative models trained with SSIM loss are excellent at
protecting its own gradients, compared the model trained
with l2 loss. Moreover, Elsayed et al.[43] added the retina
layer to DNNs, making DNNs behave strikingly similar
to humans. So we can design special architectures and
losses to make DNNs behave like humans to improve
the robustness of DNNs.

6
(c) FMR

(d) LR

Fig. 5 Comparison of reconstruction performance of GR,
FMR, and LR on adversarial examples of MNIST.

(a) Adversarial

(c) FMR
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Conclusion

In this paper, we propose a cascade target model-aware
generative adversarial example detection method that
effectively detects high-quality adversarial examples
and is more interpretable compared to current
generative model-based detection methods. High-quality

(b) GR

(a) Legitimate

(b) SSIM

(c) l1

(d) l2

(d) LR

Fig. 6 Comparison of reconstruction performance of GR,
FMR, and LR on adversarial examples of GTSRB.

impact of the adversarial example by forcing DNNs to be
human-like. For instance, SSIM similarity corresponds
with human vision. For an image pair, they are more
similar for the human with the higher similarity of
the SSIM. So we conduct experiments to compare the
robustness of the generative model, autoencoder, which

Fig. 7 Comparison of legitimate examples and gradients
of FGSM adversarial examples crafted with variant loss
on MNIST. SSIM, l1 , and l2 represent that the FGSM
adversarial examples are crafted with SSIM, l1 , and l2 loss,
respectively. The victim autoencoder is trained with SSIM
loss.
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[3]

[4]

(a) Legitimate

(b) SSIM

[5]

[6]

[7]
(c) l1

(d) l2

Fig. 8 Comparison of legitimate examples and
corresponding gradients of FGSM adversarial examples
crafted with variant loss on MNIST. In detail, SSIM, l1 ,
and l2 represent that the FGSM adversarial examples are
crafted with SSIM, l1 , and l2 loss, respectively. The victim
autoencoder is trained with l2 loss.

adversarial examples are adversarial examples within a
small lp neighborhood. By introducing the interpretable
loss, SSIM, to our generative adversarial example
detection, we provide a new perspective of the
existence of the adversarial example, which highlights
the way to explore more robust machine learning
models for the computer vision task. In this paper,
simple autoencoder is employed as the generative
model, whose performance is not so reasonable for
complicated dataset. In the future, more efficient
generative model will be explored to improve the
reconstruction performance of our method.
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